The Bonacich centrality is a well-known measure of the importance of nodes in a network, concept that is, for example, at the core of the famous Google's page-rank algorithm. In this paper we analyze the network formation when each node aims at maximizing its own centrality by deciding how to rewire its out-links. More precisely, we frame the problem in a game-theoretic setting: we consider a game in which each node of the network can decide where to place its m out-links, having its own centrality as utility function. We study the Nash equilibria (NE) and the best response dynamics of this game and we provide a complete classification of the NE when m " 1, 2. Our analysis shows that the centrality maximization performed by each node tends to create disconnected or loosely connected networks, namely 2-cliques for m " 1 and rings or a special Butterfly graph when m " 2. These results follow by showing that for m " 1, 2 the best response action of a node is always local.
INTRODUCTION
In a seminal paper the American sociologist Bonacich (1987) introduced a family of centrality measures for networks that have found wide applications in many contexts, as in social networks (e.g. representing citations among scientists), in describing Nash equilibria in networked quadratic games (C. Ballester (2006) ), in production networks among firms (Acemoglu et al. (2012) ), or in opinion dynamics models as the Friedkin-Johnsen model (Friedkin and Johnsen (1990) ).
Formally, the Bonacich centrality of a (directed) network is the unique vector π (upon normalization) such that
where, for each node i, N i is the out-neighborhood of i, d i " |N i | is its out-degree, η i can be interpreted as a sort of a-priori centrality (possibly the same for all nodes), and β P p0, 1q is some fixed parameter. A famous instance of the Bonacich centrality is the so-called page-rank centrality for web pages, introduced by Brin and Page (1998) , which is at the core of modern search engines like Google. Any search query on the web leads indeed to a set of possible related web pages that are sorted and presented according to their centrality ranking by the engine.
Due to the relevance of the page-rank centrality for the external visibility of a web page, the problem of understanding how this measure can be modified by perturbing the network has recently become very popular. Equation (1) suggests that the centrality of a node is somewhat inherited by the nodes connected to it: a node is important in the measure that important nodes have a link to it. However, the effect on the centrality caused by adding or deleting links in the network is not obvious from the recursive definition (1). It is not difficult to see that the addition of a link pi, jq always increases the centrality of the node j; less clear is how it affects the centrality of node i or, possibly, of all the other nodes in the network. In a context like that of web pages, where each node can decide only where to point its out-links, the question of how such choice modifies its centrality and what is the rewiring that can possibly optimize it, turns out to be a natural relevant question. A first analysis in this sense can be found in Avrachenkov and Litvak (2006) and in de Kerchove et al. (2008) .
by each node tends to create disconnected or loosely connected networks: the components are 2-cliques in the case m " 1, rings and a special Butterfly graph for m " 2.
While completing this research, we discovered that the same game-theoretic setting was considered in Cominetti et al. (2019) , where authors prove the existence of an ordinal potential in general cases. Our classification results are however independent as, we believe, they cannot be derived by their results.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a formal presentation of the game theoretical setting and Section 3 describes the main results. All technical results and proofs are in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5 containing a summary and some open problems.
THE MODEL
In this section, we formally define the centrality maximization game and we state the problems we want to address. We first discuss the concept of Bonacich centrality for a generic graph.
We consider a directed graph G " pV, Eq where V " t1, . . . , nu is the set of nodes and E Ď VˆV is the set of (directed) edges. We assume throughout the paper that G does not contain self-loops. As it is customary, in-and outneighborhoods of a node i are indicated, respectively, by Ní and N i . Their cardinalities dí " |Ní | and d i " |N i | are, respectively, the in-and the out-degree of node i. Under the assumption that d i ą 0 for every i P V, we equip G with the normalized weight matrix R defined as
where 1 is the characteristic function. The Bonacich centrality (1) of G can be more compactly written as π " p1´βqpI´βR 1 q´1η
(2) where I is the identity matrix, β P p0, 1q, η P R n is a fixed probability vector 1 and R 1 denotes the transpose of the matrix R. A direct check shows that π is a probability vector. Expanding (2) in a power series, we can write the centrality of a node i explicitly as
(3) Interpreting η as a vector assigning an a-priori centrality (not depending on the graph) to each node (possibly the uniform one η i " n´1 for all i), formula p3q says that the Bonacich centrality of a node in the graph G is a discounted sum of its own centrality η i and of the centrality of the other nodes discounted by the weight of the paths connecting to i through the constant β. Notice that the constant p1´βq appears just to normalize π to a probability vector.
In our setting, we start with the set of nodes V " t1, . . . , nu and we suppose that each node i is a player that assigns m directed edges from i to m other distinct elements in V. This construction results in a graph G and the Bonacich 1 A probability vector is a nonnegative vector whose entries sum up to 1. centrality of node i in G represents its utility. This can be thought as a classical game where ‚ V is the set of players; ‚ given i P V, the corresponding set of actions A i is the family of all subsets of Vztiu of cardinality m; ‚ given a strategy profile (or configuration) x P A " ś i A i , we define the graph Gpxq " pV, Epxqq where Epxq " tpi, jq | i P V, j P x i u. We denote by Rpxq the normalized weight matrix of Gpxq 2 . Given β P p0, 1q and η P R n a probability vector such that η i ą 0 for all i, we define the utility vector upxq as upxq " p1´βqpI´βRpxq 1 q´1η.
The game we have introduced is denoted ΓpV, β, η, mq to recall all the parameters entering in the construction.
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the structure of Nash equilibria for the game ΓpV, β, η, mq and to investigate the asymptotic behavior of its best response dynamics. To this aim, it is convenient to recall some fundamental definitions. Given x P A and i P V, we use the usual convention in game theory to indicate with x´i P A´i " ś k‰i A k the vector x restricted to the components in Vztiu and to use the notation x " px i , x´iq. The best response actions B i px´iq of player i, given the strategy x´i P A´i played by the other players, is the set of actions x i that maximize the utility u i , namely B i px´iq " argmax xiPAi u i px i , x´iq. A strategy profile x P A is a Nash equilibrium if x i P B i px´iq for all i, while x P A is a strict Nash equilibrium if tx i u " B i px´iq for all i (i.e. when each player is playing his best response action and such action is unique). We denote by N and N st the set of, respectively, the Nash equilibria and the strict Nash equilibria. Existence of Nash equilibria is always guaranteed for these games as they are ordinal potential, that is they admit a function Ψ : A Ñ R such that u i px i , x´iq ă u i px 1 i , x´iq if and only if Ψpx i , x´iq ă Ψpx 1 i , x´iq; this was proven in Cominetti et al. (2019) . The maxima of the ordinal potential Ψ are always Nash equilibria (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) .
The (asynchronous) best response dynamics is the discrete time Markov chain X t on the state space A where, at each time t, exactly one player updates his action by choosing it among his best response set. More in detail, the best response dynamics is formally defined as follows: at every time t P N, a player i is chosen uniformly at random and he revises his action by picking an element y in B i`p X t q´i˘uniformly at random. For ordinal potential games, a classical result of Monderer and Shapley (1996) assures that the best response dynamics converges in finite time with probability one to the set N of Nash equilibria, independently on the initial condition. In general, we can be more precise regarding this limit set N˚Ď N , which is typically a proper subset. Notice that strict Nash equilibria are absorbing points of the best response dynamics and thus N st Ď N˚; however, in general they are not equal. If we consider the transition graph on the configuration set A with edges among configurations corresponding to the non zero probability jumps of the best response dynamics chain, N˚can be characterized as the smallest trapping set of A (no edge leading out of N˚) that is globally reachable (from every configuration in A there is a path leading inside N˚). Nash equilibria in N˚play a crucial role in the games as they are those the best response dynamics will eventually converge to, while Nash equilibria in N zNẘ ill only show up in the transient behavior.
Our aim is to investigate the structure of these three sets N st Ď N˚Ď N for the game ΓpV, β, η, mq we have introduced. The ordinal potential function described in Cominetti et al. (2019) is unfortunately very complicated and of little utility in this sense.
MAIN RESULTS
In this paper we focus on the case when m " 1 and m " 2, namely when nodes are allowed to set, respectively, one or two out-links towards other nodes. Through a detailed description of the best response set B i px´iq for every configuration x´i and by exhibiting a much simpler alternative ordinal potential for the case m " 1, we are capable of giving a full description of the three sets N st , N˚and N of Nash equilibria for both cases m " 1 and m " 2. This last case presents a much more complex behavior and, for certain aspects, as complex as the case of general m.
3.1 The case of out-degree m " 1
In order to describe our results, it is convenient to introduce a particular family of graphs. Definition 1. We call a 2-clique the complete directed graph (without self-loops) with two nodes and we indicate it by C 2 . Given l, r P N, we define C l,r 2 as the directed graph obtained by taking the disjoint union of l copies of C 2 plus r extra nodes, each of them having exactly one out-link towards one node in any of the 2-cliques.
Notice that C l,r 2 has exactly n " 2l`r nodes and all nodes have out-degree equal to one. Figure 1 is an example of graph of type C l,r 2 for l " 3 and r " 6. The following theorem is our first main result for the case m " 1. Theorem 2. For every choice of β and η, the game ΓpV, β, η, 1q has the following properties:
(1) ΓpV, β, η, 1q is an ordinal potential w.r.t. the function Ψ : A Ñ N where Ψpxq is the number of 2-cliques in Gpxq;
(2) the set of Nash equilibria N coincides with all the configurations x P A for which Gpxq is of type C l,r 2 with 2l`r " n; (3) the set of strict Nash equilibria N st is empty when n is odd and it coincides with all the configurations x P A for which Gpxq is of type C n{2,0 2 when n is even.
Figure 2 (a) represents a strict Nash equilibrium for the game ΓpV, β, η, 1q when n " 8, while Fig. 2(b) shows a nonstrict Nash equilibrium for n " 7. The following corollary completely captures the asymptotic behavior of the best response dynamics of ΓpV, β, η, 1q; in particular it shows that the Nash equilibrium of Fig. 2 
Corollary 3. Consider the best response dynamics for the game ΓpV, β, η, 1q. Then:
‚ if n is even, the limit set N˚coincides with N st , namely it consists of those
We notice that when n " 2k, the best response dynamics will eventually be absorbed in any of the |N˚| " n!2´kpk!q´1 strict Nash equilibria with probability one. On the other hand, when n " 2k`1 the best response dynamics will eventually reach the (unique) trapping set consisting of |N˚| " pn´1qn!2´kpk!q´1 configurations of type C pn´1q{2,1 2
. In this case, it can be shown that the best response dynamics will keep fluctuating ergodically in the set N˚with uniform equilibrium probability.
The case of out-degree m " 2
We call ring graph an undirected graph whose vertices are arranged in a ring so that each vertex has exactly two neighbors (see for example Fig. 3 (a), where each connected component is a ring graph). The length of a ring graph is the number of its vertices. From now on we say that an edge pi, jq in G is undirected if also pj, iq is an edge of G, otherwise we call it directed. We say that a graph is undirected if all its edges are undirected. In figures, we represent directed edges with arrows and undirected edges with simple lines.
The first main result of this section is a complete characterization of the set of strict Nash equilibria. Theorem 4. For any choice of β and η, the set of strict Nash equilibria N st of the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q consists of all the configurations x P A for which Gpxq is a (finite) union of ring graphs.
A consequence of this fact is that for any n ě 3 there always exists a strict Nash equilibrium, as the ring graph of length n is always one of these. Figure 3 (a) provides an example of strict Nash equilibrium for ΓpV, β, η, 2q with n " 9.
We now investigate the structure of all Nash equilibria. Given a Nash equilibrium x P A, let tG λ pxqu λ"1,...,Λ be the decomposition of Gpxq in terms of its strongly connected components. The condensation graph of Gpxq is defined as the graph Hpxq whose nodes are the components tG λ pxqu λ and where there is an edge from G λ1 pxq to G λ2 pxq if there exists an edge in Gpxq from a node in G λ1 pxq to a node in G λ2 pxq. The condensation graph Hpxq is directed and acyclic. The following theorem describes the topology of Hpxq, thus characterizing the structure of the Nash equilibria of the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q. We remind that a vertex is called a sink if it has zero out-degree and it is called a source if it has zero in-degree. Theorem 5. Let x P A be a Nash equilibrium for the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q, tG λ pxqu λ"1,...,Λ be the decomposition of Gpxq in terms of its strongly connected components and Hpxq be the condensation graph of Gpxq. Then the following facts hold:
(1) every component G λ pxq is either a sink or a source in Hpxq (or both if isolated); (2) every source component is either a singleton or a 2clique; (3) every sink component is either a ring or the Butterfly graph in Fig. 3(b) .
Notice that the Butterfly graph is a nonstrict Nash equilibrium as the best response of the node in the center is not unique. Figure 4 provides other two examples of nonstrict Nash equilibria for the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q: in both structures we can identify either a singleton or a 2-clique linking to rings. The nodes in white are the nodes whose best response is not unique, i.e. they can change action without decreasing their utility. Remark 6. Not all the configurations x P A that satisfy conditions (1), (2) and (3) of Theorem 5 are Nash equilibria. Indeed, by direct computation it is easy to see that the following examples are not Nash equilibria:
(1) a singleton linking to two adjacent nodes in a ring of length greater or equal than four (see Fig. 5 (a)); (2) a 2-clique linking to a single node in a ring of length greater or equal than four (see Fig. 5(b) ). 6 . Convergence of the best response dynamics starting from the same initial configuration to (a) a strict Nash equibrium (b) a nonstrict Nash equilibrium.
We are now ready to characterize the limit set N˚Ă N for the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q, i.e. the absorbing points of its best response dynamics. Corollary 7. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q with |V| " n, and let i P t0, 1, 2u such that n " i mod 3. Then:
‚ if i " 0, 1, the limit set N˚coincides with N st , namely it consists of those x P A for which Gpxq is a finite union of ring graphs;
is the set of all graphs that are finite unions of rings of length three and a Butterfly graph or finite unions of rings of length three and a 2-clique linking to any pair of nodes in the rings (see for example Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 13(b) and (c)). Figure 6 shows the convergence of the best response dynamics starting from the same initial configuration to two different equilibria, namely a strict Nash equilibrium (union of rings) and a nonstrict Nash equilibrium in G 3 b (union of rings of length three and a Butterfly graph). The simulations have been done by using suitable Matlab routines.
PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
The proofs of our results are based on a probabilistic interpretation of the game in terms of Markov chains. This section is structured as follows: we first recall some preliminary notions and then we apply some classical results on Markov chains to our game. Finally, in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we prove the results presented in the previous section respectively for the case m " 1 and m " 2.
A (discrete-time) Markov chain X t on a finite state space V " t1, . . . , nu and with transition matrix P P R nˆn , P stochastic, is a sequence of random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . with values in V s.t. PpX t`1 " i|X 1 " j 1 , . . . , X t " j t q " PpX t`1 " i|X t " j t q " P ijt . Given s P V, we define T s :" inftt ě 0 : X t " su the hitting time on s and Ts :" inftt ě 1 : X t " su the return time to s. Given i, s P V, we define τ s i :" E i rT s s the expected hitting time on s of the Markov chain X t with initial state i. It is known that if P is an irreducible matrix, then the Markov chain admits a unique invariant distribution, that is a probability vector π s.t. π " P 1 π. The invariant distribution π can be written in terms of hitting times: Proposition 8. Let X t be a Markov chain with finite state space V and irreducible transition matrix P , and let π be its (unique) invariant distribution. Then it holds that
where the expected hitting times τ s i , i P V, are the only family of values satisfying the following system:
Proof. Equation (4) comes from the fact that π s " pE s rTs sq´1 and E s rTs s " 1`ř iPV P si τ s i , which are both standard results on Markov chains, as well as (5). See for example Norris (1997) . l
Manipulating (2) and using the fact that 1 1 π " 1 with 1 the all-ones vector, we can see that the Bonacich centrality π satisfies the relation π " pβR 1`p 1´βqη1 1 qπ. Since P " βR`p1´βq1η 1 is an irreducible stochastic matrix, this means that π is the (unique) invariant distribution of the Markov chain having P as transition matrix. We now use this characterization in the context of our game. Given a configuration x P A, we write P pxq " βRpxq`p1´βq1η 1 (6) and we denote by τ s i pxq the hitting times on s of the Markov chain having P pxq as transition matrix and starting from i. When the configuration x is clear from the context, sometimes we write τ s i instead of τ s i pxq to ease the notation. The utility vector upxq can be written in terms of the formula (4) as:
Notice that the terms P si pxq only depend on x s (the outlinks from s), while the hitting times τ s i pxq depend only on x´s. With slight abuse of notation, we then rewrite the utility function as u s px s , x´sq "˜1`ÿ iPV P si px s qτ s i px´sq¸´1 .
A consequence of (8) is an explicit formula describing the best response actions, as shown by the following corollary. Corollary 9. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, mq, a node s P V and x´s P A´s. Then the set B s px´sq of the best response actions of player s when all the other players are playing the actions x´s can be written as:
Proof. It follows from (8) and the definition (6) of P , in consideration of the fact that the term p1´βq1η 1 does not depend on the configuration x. l
In the following, given x P A we denote by Nś pxq the in-neighborhood of the vertex s in the graph Gpxq, that is i P Nś pxq if and only if s P x i (or equivalently, if and only if R is pxq ą 0). Notice that Nś pxq depends just on x´s so with a slight abuse of notation we can write Nś px´sq.
The case of out-degree m " 1
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need to better characterize the best response actions of a player. The first important observation is the following: Remark 10. If m " 1, then for any s P V and x s P A s it holds that R sxs px s q " 1 and R si px s q " 0 for all i ‰ x s . Therefore (9) takes the form: B s px´sq " argmin iPVztsu τ s i px´sq.
The following proposition shows that the best response action of a player in the game ΓpV, β, η, 1q takes always place in his in-neighborhood, as long as it is nonempty. Proposition 11. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 1q and let s P V and x´s P A´s. It holds that:
(1) If Nś px´sq ‰ H, then B s px´sq " Nś px´sq;
(2) If Nś px´sq " H, then B s px´sq " Vztsu.
Furthermore, it holds that u s px s , x´sq ă u s px 1 s , x´sq ô x s R Nś px´sq^x 1 s P Nś px´sq.
Proof. p1q Suppose that Nś px´sq ‰ H and let i, j, k ‰ s s.t. i, j P Nś px´sq and k R Nś px´sq. We show that τ s i " τ s j and τ s i ă τ s k ; by Remark 10, this implies that B s px´sq " Nś px´sq. By Proposition 8, it holds that
Since τ s x k ą 0, it follows that τ s i " τ s j and τ s i ă τ s k . p2q Suppose that Nś px´sq " H and let j ‰ s. This implies that at every discrete time t, the probability to arrive at node s from j is equal to p1´η s q t´1 η s . Therefore it holds that
which does not depend on j. We have just proven that τ s j " τ s i for every i, j ‰ s, so we conclude by Remark 10. Finally, by (7) A configuration x P A is a Nash equilibrium iff for all s P V, it holds that x s P B s px´sq. By Proposition 11, this happens iff for all s P V s.t. Nś px´sq ‰ H, we have that x s P Nś px´sq, thus forming the 2-clique ts, x s u in Gpxq. Therefore x P A is a Nash equilibrium iff Gpxq is of type C l,r 2 where r is the number of vertices s P V such that Nś px´sq " H. p3q A configuration x P A is a strict Nash equilibrium iff for all s P V, it holds that tx s u " B s px´sq; by Proposition 11 this in turn holds iff for all s P V, Nś px´sq " tx s u. Therefore for all s P V, ts, x s u must be a 2-clique in Gpxq, and this is possible iff n is even and Gpxq is of type C n{2,0 2 . l Corollary 3 easily follows from the theorem we have just proved and Proposition 11.
Proof of Corollary 3. Consider the graph X on vertex set A and an edge between px s , x´sq and px 1 s , x´sq if Ψpx s , x´sq ď Ψpx 1 s , x´sq, where Ψ is the ordinal potential function defined in Theorem 2. The best response dynamics is a Markov chain X t on the graph X where each edge has a nonzero probability. It then sufficies to prove that for any Nash equilibrium x, there is a path in X from x to a configuration x 1 such that Gpx 1 q has the maximal number of 2-cliques. By Theorem 2, Gpxq is of type C l,r 2 ; suppose l ă pn´1q{2. Then by Proposition 11, there are i ‰ j P V such that they both have zero in-degree in Gpxq. By setting x 1 i " j, x 1 " px 1 i , x´iq and x 2 j " i, x 2 " px 2 j , x 1 j q, we have that Ψpxq " Ψpx 1 q ă Ψpx 2 q. In other words, Gpx 2 q is of type C l`1,r´2 2 and there is a path from x to x 2 in X . By iterating this argument, we conclude. l 4.2 The case of out-degree m " 2
As in the case of m " 1, we want to better characterize the best response actions of a player. The following two lemmas will be useful for proving the subsequent Proposition 14, in which we show that the best response actions of a node s are always towards nodes that are at most at distance two from it. Lemma 12. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q, and let x P A and s P V. It holds that:
(1) for every i ‰ s, τ s i pxq ď η´1 s p1´βq´1; (2) if there exists i ‰ s such that τ s i pxq " η´1 s p1´βq´1, then Nś pxq " H.
Proof. p1q Let A be a matrix such that for all i P V, A ii " β`p1´βqη i and for all j ‰ i, A ij " p1´βqη j . If we denote byτ s i the expected hitting time of the Markov chain X t with transition matrix A and initial state s, by solving the system (5) it is easy to see that for all i, k ‰ s it holds thatτ s i "τ s k . This in turn implies that for every i ‰ s, τ s i " η´1 s p1´βq´1. InX t the probability to jump from any node i to s is always equal to p1´βqη s , while in the Markov chain X t associated to our game (with transition matrix as in (6)) the probability to jump from any node i to s is always greater or equal than p1´βqη s . It follows that τ s i ďτ s i , so we conclude. p2q Let i ‰ s such that τ s i " η´1 s p1´βq´1. We first show that for every j ‰ s, τ s j " η´1 s p1´βq´1. Indeed, suppose by contrary that there exists j ‰ s such that τ s j ă η´1 s p1´βq´1. If a, b P V are the vertices such that x i " ta, bu, then by system (5) it holds that
In view of item p1q, this implies that τ s i ă η´1 s p1´βq´1, which is a contradiction; therefore τ s j " η´1 s p1´βq´1. Suppose now by contradiction that Nś pxq ‰ H and let k P Nś pxq and a ‰ s such that a P x k . By system (5) it holds that
As τ s v " η´1 s p1´βq´1 for every v ‰ s and τ s s " 0, equation (12) implies that β " 0; this is a contradiction and so we conclude. l
The next lemma provides a different upper bound on the return times τ s i pxq when |Nś pxq| ě 1. We denote by N´2 s pxq the set Nś pxq Y tNt pxq : t P Nś pxqu, that is the in-neighborhood of s in Gpxq at distance at most two. Notice that also N´2 s pxq depends just on x´s so we can write as well N´2 s px´sq. Lemma 13. Consider the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q and let x P A and s P V such that |Nś pxq| ě 1. Consider a node k P Nś pxq and let T 1 " p1´β 2 qp1´βq´1pη s`β 2 η k q´1 and T 2 " p1´βq´1pη s`β 2 η k q´1. Then it holds that:
(1) τ s k pxq ď T 1 and for all i ‰ k, τ s i pxq ď T 2 ; (2) if τ s k pxq " T 1 and for all i ‰ k, s it holds that τ s i pxq " T 2 , then |N´2 s pxq| " 1.
Proof. p1q Let τ s max " max jPV τ s j . By system (5) it holds that τ s max ď 1`p1´βqη k τ s k`p 1´βqp1´η s´ηk qτ s max`β τ s max , which implies that τ s max ď p1´βq´1pη k`ηs q´1`η k pη k`ηs q´1τ s k . (13) At the same time, by system (5) it holds that τ s k ď 1p 1´βqp1´η s´ηk qτ s max`p 1´βqη k τ s k`p β{2qτ s max , which implies that
By substituting inequality (13) in (14), the following upper bound is obtained:
while by substituting inequality (14) in (13) we obtain:
(2) It sufficies to prove that assuming that there exists a node j P Nś pxq Y Nḱ pxq with j ‰ k leads to a contradiction. Let j P Nś pxq Y Nḱ pxq with j ‰ k and let b P V such that x j " tk, bu. By system (5), τ s j satisfies:
By substituting the values of the τ s i 's in the hypothesis and by observing that T 1 ă T 2 , equation (15) leads to:
which is a contradiction. This means that the set Nś pxq Y Nḱ pxq has to be equal to tku and so |N´2 s pxq| " 1. l
The following proposition characterizes the set of the best response actions of a player in the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q and it will play a key role in both the proofs of Theorem 4 and Theorem 5. From now on, fixed s P V and x P A, we label the elements of V in such a way that V " ts, v 1 , . . . , v n´1 u and 0 " τ s s pxq ă τ s v1 pxq ď τ s v2 pxq ď¨¨¨ď τ s vn´1 pxq. (11), so we conclude. p2q We remind that we label the elements of V in such a way that (16) holds. We first show that v 1 P Nś pxq. By contradiction, suppose that v 1 R Nś pxq; then x v1 " ta, bu for some a, b ‰ s. It holds that
which implies that τ s v1 ě η´1 s p1´βq´1. By Lemma 12, it follows that τ s v1 " η´1 s p1´βq´1 and Nś pxq " H, which is a contradiction. Therefore, if N´2 s pxq " Nś pxq " tru, it holds that r " v 1 and so r P x s for any x s P B s px´sq. We now show that τ s j " τ s k for every j, k ‰ r, s, which implies that B s px´sq " tr, vu : v P Vzts, ru ( . By hypothesis, for every j ‰ s, r, the probability to jump from j to s is equal to p1´βqη s and the probability to jump from j to r is equal to p1´βqη r . Therefore the probability to jump from j to k ‰ r, s is equal to 1´p1´βqpη s`ηr q. It follows that the probability to arrive in s from j in exactly t steps without passing through r is equal to p1´βqη s p1´p1β qpη s`ηrt´1 and the probability to arrive in r from j in exactly t steps without passing through s is equal to p1´βqη r p1´p1´βqpη s`ηrt´1 . Consequently,
which does not depend on j.
p3q Suppose that |N´2 s pxq| ě 2. We already proved that v 1 P Nś pxq; we need to prove that either v 2 P Nś pxq or v 2 P Nv 1 pxq. Suppose by contradiction that this is not the case and let a, b ‰ s, v 1 such that x v2 " ta, bu. By applying system (5) to express τ s v2 and by using the fact that for all j ě 2, τ s vj ě τ s v2 , it holds that:
Moreover, by applying system (5) to express τ s v1 and by using again the fact that for all j ě 2, τ s vj ě τ s v2 , it holds that:
By substituting inequality (17) in (18) and inequality (18) in (17) we obtain respectively: τ s v1 ě T 1 and τ s v2 ě T 2 , where T 1 and T 2 are defined in Lemma 13. Therefore, by (16) and item (1) of Lemma 13, it holds that τ s v1 " T 1 , and for all j ě 2, τ s vj " T 2 . By applying item (2) of the same lemma it follows that |N´2 s pxq| " 1, which contradicts the hypothesis. l Proof of Theorem 4. We first prove that a ring graph on n vertices is a strict Nash equilibrium for ΓpV, β, η, 2q. If n " 3 the proof is trivial. Suppose then that n ą 3 and consider the ring graph as in Fig. 10(a) ; we want to show that the node s is in its (unique) best response, that is we want to show that τ s 1 , τ s n´1 ă τ s v for all v ‰ 1, n´1. By the symmetry of the graph, τ s 1 " τ s n´1 and τ s 2 " τ s n´2 . In view of Proposition 14, it then suffices to show that τ s 1 ă τ s 2 . By system (5), we have that τ s 2´τ s 1 " pβ{2qpτ s 1´τ s 2 q`pβ{2qτ s 3 , which implies that τ s 2 ą τ s 1 since τ s 3 ą 0. We now show that if x˚is a strict Nash equilibrium for ΓpV, β, η, 2q, then Gpx˚q is undirected, which implies that Gpx˚q is the union of ring graphs since by construction each vertex of Gpx˚q has out-degree equal to 2. Assume by contradiction that there exists a strict Nash equilibrium x and two nodes s, j P V such that ps, jq P Epxq but pj, sq R Epxq. Since x is a strict Nash equilibrium, all the nodes are in their best response and |B v pxq| " 1 for all v P V. By Proposition 14 we know that s P N´2 j pxq: since pj, sq R Epxq, it means that there exists i ‰ j, s such that ps, iq, pi, jq, pj, iq P Epxq (see Fig. 11(a) ). Proposition 14 also implies that i P N´2 s pxq. If i P Nś pxq, by system (5) it holds that τ s i´τ s j " pβ{2qpτ s j´τ s i q and so τ s i " τ s j . Therefore we have that either ps, jq P Epxq or |B s pxq| ą 1, both cases leading to a contradiction. We now examine the case i P N´2 s pxqzNś pxq: by Proposition 14 there exists k ‰ i, s such that pi, kq, pk, sq, ps, kq P Epxq (see Fig.  11(b) ). Proposition 14 also implies that k P N´2 i pxq. If k P Ní pxq, we are in the situation represented in Fig.  11 (c); by using system (5), it is easy to see that τ s j " τ s k . This implies that either k " j (in which case ps, jq P Epxq) or |B s pxq| ą 1, so we always arrive to a contradiction. Finally, we need to consider the case k P N´2 i pxqzNí pxq: since the actions of i are determined as in Fig. 11(b) , it must hold that pk, jq P Epxq, as represented in Fig. 11(d) . By using again system (5) to express τ s i and τ s j , we get that p1`β{2qpτ s i´τ s j q " pβ{2qτ s k ą 0 and so τ s i ą τ s j . This implies that either s is not in its best response or its best response is not unique, both cases leading to a contradiction. l Definition 15. We denote by T pj,sq,i the directed graph on the vertices ti, j, su having one directed edge pj, sq and all the other edges undirected (see Fig. 10(b) ).
In the following we will sometimes refer to a graph of type T pj,sq,i as a triangle. Lemma 16. Let x P A be a Nash equilibrium for the game ΓpV, β, η, 2q, Hpxq be the condensation graph of Gpxq and let G λ pxq " pV λ , E λ q be a sink in Hpxq. If there exists pj, sq P E λ that is directed, then G λ pxq contains a structure of type T pj,sq,i .
Proof. Notice that since the out-degree of each node in G λ pxq is equal to two, this graph must contain at least three nodes and |N´2 j pxq| ě 2. By Proposition 14, it follows that s P N´2 j pxq and there exists i P V λ such that ps, iq, pi, jq, pj, iq P E λ (see Fig. 11(a) ). We are left to prove that pi, sq P E λ . If this was not the case, then by Proposition 14 there would exist k P V λ such that pi, kq, pk, sq, ps, kq P E λ , i.e. the graph in Fig. 11(b) would be a subgraph of G λ pxq. In this configuration, the only way i could be at equilibrium is that pk, iq P E λ , as otherwise tj, su would give it a strictly better utility than tj, ku. We would then be in the configuration of Fig. 11(c) ; but in this case s is not at equilibrium, as tj, ku gives it a strictly better utility than ti, ku. This completes the proof. l
We are now ready to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider any component G λ pxq " pV λ , E λ q that is not a sink in Hpxq. Necessarily, there must exist i P V λ such that N i pxq Ę V λ . In particular, this implies that |N´2 i pxq| ď 1 by Proposition 14. If |N´2 i pxq| " 0, it means that V λ " tiu is a singleton. If |N´2 i pxq| " 1, then necessarily V λ " ti, ju for some j ‰ i and so G λ pxq is the 2-clique on ti, ju. Notice that in both cases, there cannot be any other component G λ 1 pxq linking to G λ pxq in the condensation graph, as otherwise the condition |N´2 i pxq| ď 1 would be violated. This proves items p1q and p2q.
We now study the structure of the sink components. Suppose that the component G λ pxq " pV λ , E λ q is not a ring graph and thus not undirected; then there must exist at least two directed edges in E λ . Let pj, sq be one of these directed edges and let T pj,sq,i be the corresponding triangle (see Definition 15 and Lemma 16). We now discuss how any other triangle T pr,kq,t in G λ pxq can possibly intersect with T pj,sq,i . Notice that, since the out-degree of all nodes in G λ pxq is 2, the two triangles cannot intersect in the nodes of out-degree equal to two in the corresponding triangles, namely ti, juXtr, k, tu " H and tr, tuXti, j, su " H. Therefore the only possibility is that they have just one node in common, namely s " k; this corresponds to the Butterfly graph (see Fig. 3(b) ). Since in the Butterfly graph every node has out-degree equal to 2, it necessarily coincides with the connected component G λ pxq. If instead T pj,sq,i does not intersect any other triangle, there must exist a sequence of distinct nodes s 1 " s, s 2 , . . . , s l " r, with l ě 2, such that ts a , s a`1 u are 2-cliques in G λ pxq for a " 1, . . . , l´1 and such that there exists a triangle T pr,kq,t in G λ pxq for some k, t. Since there cannot be any incoming directed edge in r by hypothesis, we deduce that N´2 r pxq " ts l´1 , s l´2 u if l ě 3 and N´2 r pxq " ti, j, su if l " 2. This last case is impossible since it would result that k P ti, j, su, contrarily to what we had assumed. In the case when l ě 3, we obtain that k " s l´2 that leads to the graph depicted in Fig. 12 . A direct computation shows that nodes s and k are however not at equilibrium in this configuration. This completes the proof. l
Finally, we provide the proofs of Remark 6 and Corollary 7.
